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ABSTRACT
There has been a paucity of research performed in the field of cognition as it pertains to man's psychic development. Writers such as Arieti
have deplored this neglect. The present study investigated certain aspects
of cognitive functioning among emotionally disturbed and normal boys.
Both the Genevan and the Harvard schools have performed extensive
studies of cognitive development. They offered different interprtations,
however, of the mechanisms by which cogntive growth occurs. Piaget proposed two mechanisms by which this takes place, accommodation and assimilation. Bruner placed more emphasis on the role of language in development.
Bother schools would expect that emotionally disturbed children would
demonstrate deficiencies in their language abilities. Bruner. would imply
that it was this deficiency that was contributing to an individual's emotional disturbance. i. e., if the individual could not make use of language
to organize his world, he would exhibit maladaptive behavior. His reasoning
follows that of Vygotsky and Luria.
Piaget, on the other hand, would more easily maintain that the individual simply had not matured sufficiently to allow him proper command of language.
Rimoldi has also devoted considerable effort in investigating the relationships between language, thinking, and logical structure. His research
has given strong indications that there are relationships between what structures can be handled and what languages are available. He has also contributed
a unique methodology for studying cognitive functioning through problem solving. Rimoldi's method was employed in this research.
A sample of 32 boys between the ages of 9 and 12 years of age who had
been presented to four institutions in the Chicago area as being too disturbed to cope with school and home without psychiatric help were tested by
this method. Another sample of boys who were matched to the disturbed sample
in age and I.Q. but were not known to have any psychiatric problems were also
administered the same problems.
The presentation of these problems varied in terms of abstractnessconcreteness. The internal structure also varied from less to more complex.
The score for each b9y was based on how he went about solving the problem
although the ocrrectness of his final answer was also recorded.
The analyses of the data revealed that the disturbed group performed
significantly more poorly than the nondisturbed sample. Furthermore, it was
observed that the disturbed sample exhibited an inability to deal with the
structurally isomorphic problems when they were presented to them in verbal
rather than picture form. That is, disturbed boys could cope with certain
problems when.presented to them in picture fashion, but not when the information was conveyed in verbal terms. Further inspection revealed that 11and 12-year-old boys could solve the more simple verbal problems but not the

complex verbal problems.
The results were seen as indicating that the Rimoldi method was sensiive to differences in cognitive functioning among disturbed children while
scores based on number of correct answers did not reveal differences between
the group. More importantly, these results indicate that a preferable approach to teaching disturbed children may be a nonverbal one since this
may be comprehensible to them while verbal communication containing the
same information might not be.
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Chapter I
Introduction
The last century has seen a vast growth in man's knowledge about
himself.

Fr.eud' s tremendous contributions in the realm of man's uncon-

scious has made his name a household word.
gained that stature is that of Jean Piaget.

I

Another name that has recently
His voluminous writings on the

development of cognition have been presented, in one form or another, to
almost every section of society.
While there have been numerous other areas of development, these two
men stand as landmarks in this vast field.

It is worthy of note, then, that

there has been so little intercommunication between psychiatry and cognition.
As Arieti (1970) expresses it, "Cognition is or has been, up to now, the Cinderella of

psychoanal~sis

and psychiatry.

No other field of the psyche has

been so consistently neglected [p. 91]."
What Arieti refers to here is not simply cognition itself.
has been a great deal of work devoted to cognition.
plain~ng

There

What Arieti is com-

about is that the work on cognition has seldom been done with an

eye to furthering understanding of what Arieti calls man's intrapsychic life.
And, he goes on to say, "This situation is particularly unacceptable to
people, like the present writer, who believe that cognition should receive
l
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the place of honor in psychiatric studies [p. 91]."
Arieti's point is well taken and it is surprising to realize that
there has been so little work in this combined area.

Certain limited areas

have been investigated, such as Goldstein's (1942) study of the results
of injury to the brain, but by and large it is a neglected area.
The increased interest in cognitive development and child psychiatry
are no doubt helping to bring these areas closer together.

The present

investigation, for example, is an attempt to study the...combined areas of
cognition and psychiatry.
It is to be ·expected that a child who, because of some emotional
disturbance, has developed maladaptive behavior will manifest some cognitive
anomalies or deficits.
attention.

What these differences might be have received little

Much of the work so far has investigated such factors as the

different patterns of intelligence scores produced by disturbed children.
And yet, writers such as Vygotsky, Piaget, Bruner, and even Whorf have
pointed out how an individual's cognitive framework structures his perceptions of the world around him.

As will be _seen in the following chapter,

Vygotsky and Piaget view the relationship between.cognitive structure and
•
perceptual framework quite differently. Nevertheless both would agree that
an individual's cognitive development is intimately linked with his emotional
well being.

It would seem natural and desirable, then, to investigate the

cognitive functioning of emotionally disturbed children.

Differences in the

cognitive functioning could conceivably dictate different approaches to their
education as well as their treatment.
An additional reason for studyimg the cognitive functioning of dis-
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turbed children, is to learn more about cognition.

Rimoldi (1967a), for

instance, in his investigation of the relationships between thought and language, points out that certain features of the cognitive process may manifest themselves only "at the early stages of development or in the deterioration due to ageing or pathological conditions [p. 28]."
Arieti (1970) also points this out.

"From the acquisition of lan-

guage (naming things) to a logical organization of concepts various substages follow each other so rapidly and overlap in so many multiple ways that
it is very difficult to retrace and individualize them.

These intermediary

stages are more pronounced and more easily recognizable in pathological
conditions [p. 97]."
It is hoped, therefore, that a study of cognitive functioning in
emotionally disturbed individuals will shed light on both cognitive functioning and on pathology.
As a further consideration, special attention will be paid to the
role of language in cognition.

As has been implied above, language, in its

broadest sense, plays a key role in cognitive development.

One of the aims

of this study, therefore, was to study the role of language in cognitive
functioning of disturbed boys to see how it differed from the way language
was used by a normal group.
The experimental method of this investigation studied the cognitive
processes of normal and emotionally disturbed boys, based on their performance on a series of problems developed by Rimoldi (1970).

The cognitive

tasks varied in terms of: (1) the complexity of the problem or its internal
structure, and (2) the level of abstractness at which the problem was
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presented to the subject.

Complexity refers to the number of bits of

information to be processed to find an answer and abstractness refers to the
manner of presentation, varying from pictures to symbolic.

Earlier work

(Rimoldi et al. 1970) indicated that there were significant differences
between these parameters in normal boys.

Although literature in this area

does not suggest any particular hypothesis, this investigation was performed
with the aim of studying possible differences that might be found to exist
both within and between group performances.
The work of Rimoldi (Rimoldi et al. 1970) also indicated that
variations among the subj.ects in both intelligence and age also resulted
in significant differences in the level of their performances.

For this

reason it was decided to control these variables by matching the emotionally
disturbed sample with' a normal or non-disturbed sample on the basis of

a~e

and

intelligence.
To achieve this purpose the design employed was a 2 X 3 X 2 factorial
with repeated

measur~s

on the last two factors.

The two groups, disturbed

and normal, constituted one factor, the three levels of abstractness con\,

stituted the three levels of the second factor, and the two levels of difficulty the third factor.

Chapter II
Review of the Literature
Rutter (1966) wrote that the characteristic feature of the psychotic
child's cognitive functioning was not its level but its pattern.

Appelbaum
\.-

( 1969) showed that long term psychotherapy served to raise a child's intelligence quotient.

Sarason (1966) pointed out that "the impacts on

cognitive processes of environmental experiences and idiosyncratic motivations are ultimately related to the individual's actual problem-solving
behavior [p. 464]. 11
The above are but a brief sample of opinions that psychologists hold
concerning the relationship between cognitive processes and emotional functioning.

It is probably safe to say that all clinicians would subscribe to

the statement that cognitive processes and emotional functioning are intimately associated, but that there are subtle differences in how they view
the relationship.
Rapaport (1944) perhaps best summarized an earlier, psychoanalytically oriented approach to this question of the association between cognition and emotion.

For many of the psychoanalytic school.the aspect of

the relationship which they preferred to view as primary was the affect.
Thus, an individual must first develop proper affect.
develop and/or use cognitive functions.

Only then could he

Knowledge is seen as a threat to
5
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some people.

For these persons their cognitive abilities become inhibited

and acquisition of further knowledge becomes almost impossible.

As

Watson (1965) sums this up "children may be affectively rather than intellectually stupid [p. 498]."
Rabin and Winder (1969) developed this notion in regard to schizophrenics.

"Persons who prefer psychodynamic and other psychosocial explana-

tions of schizophrenia expect to find that stimulus content influences
performance.

In general, the expectation is that human content and, more

specifically, conflict related content, will tend to disrupt cognitive
processes [p. 216]."
Brody (1969), in her approach to therapy with disturbed children,
explicitly aims at fostering affect.

Her assertion is that cognitive develop-

ment will follow automatically once proper affect is established.
Theoreticians primarily interested in cognition have also been concerned with emotional functioning and, as might be expected, have proposed
different views of the relationship.
Although Piaget has apparently never addressed himself to the
question of how cognitive development affects mental illness, his exten-

.

sive work in the area of cognitive development has made a great impact on
the field and he has exerted wide influence on those working in it.
A significant aspect of Piaget's contribution is his theory that
human knowledge is an activity on the part of the individual.

Furth (1969)

stated that Piaget holds that behavior at all levels· demonstrates aspects of
structuring and that Piaget identifies structuring with knowing.

That is,

the individual structures all that is known to him; he does not merely
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receive the world around him, he constructs iti

How the individual goes

about this structuring of his world presents yet another problem.

Luria

(1961), developing the work of Vygotsky, maintains that the principal instrument by which the child goes about structuring his world is the verbal
process, represented in language.
Piaget (1963), on the other hand, doubted that language has such
an important role to play.

"If it is legitimate·to consider language as

playing a central role in the formation of thought, it is insofar as it
constitutes one of the manifestations of the symbolic -function while the
development of this symbolic function is itself dominated by the intelligence in all its aspects [p. 57]."

The processes for structuring the world

that Piaget offers as alternatives to verbal processes are assimilation and
accommodation.

Piaget sees these processes as basic and underlying even

such processes as language.
Assimilation is the term for the psychological relation of a stimulus to a reacting organism and expresses an inner CQrrespondence or sameness between an environmental phenomenon and the structure within the
organism.
outgoing

Furth (1969) defined Piaget's principl"e of accommodation as "the
proces~

reality state.

of an operative action oriented toward some particular
Accommodation applies a general structure to a particular

situation; as such, it always contains some element of newness [p. 259]."
According to Piaget, both assimilation and accommodation are
carried out in a series of stages through which each individual must pass
on his way to maturity.

Within each stage are particular schemes or oper-

ations; organized, universal forms of specific knowing activities.

Thus,
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in the first stage, the sensory-motor stage, there are various schemes which
both constitute and characterize the stage.

Some of these schemes are

grasping, sucking, handling, and the like.

The child is thus limited to

what it can assimilate by what can be grasped, sucked, etc.

Therefore,

during this first sensory-motor stage which lasts about two years the
child can organize very little.

The next question to be answered in this

context is what relationship, if any, does Piaget see between the development of cognitive processes and emotional functioning.

Piaget and Inhelder

(1969), in addressing themselves to this p0int, noted:-"Studying the infant's
affectivity is much more difficult than studying his cognitive functions •••
for the risk of 'adultomophism' is much greater in this area [p. 21]."

Al-

though they have not experimented in this area themselves they have reported
a number of studies by others which presumably support their own thinking.
Their contention is that there are stages of affectivity which develop in a manner corresponding to the stages of cognitive development.
These affective stages are, in one sense,

independ~nt

from cognitive growth.

It remains to be noted that, insofar as such correlations are
verified [correlations between stages of affectivity and the
stages at which. the individual can 'construct' various objects],
that is, insofar as affectivity is inseparable from the whole
of behavior without constituting either a cause or an effect of
·the cognitive structurations, the essential factor in object relations is the relation itself between the subject and the affective object • • • • [p. 27],
Another individual who has made significant contributions to this
area is J. S. Bruner.

Similar to Piaget, Bruner is primarily interested in

investigating the course of cognitive growth.

It is only secondarily that

he adverts to the question of the interrelatedness of cognition and emotional states.
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His epistemological point of origin is rather close to Piaget's,
namely, a constructivistic theory of cognition.

However, the manner in

which he sees the individual as constructing his world is slightly different than Piaget's.

Bruner relies upon the analogy of information processing

and talks in terms of various systems that individuals use, that is,
"systems of processing information by which human beings construct models
of their world (1964, p. l]."

He distinguished 'three of these systems and

stated that individuals process their information: (1) through action,
(2) through imagery, and (3) through language.
A second area.of concern to Bruner is integration, "the means whereby acts are organized into higher-order ensembles, making possible the use
of larger and larger units of information for the solution of particular
problems (1964, p. l]."

Extrapolating from anthropological findings, Bruner

stated that man has changed himself by his use of three "implementation1
systems": (1) amplifiers of human motor control (tools, etc.); (2) amplifiers of sensory capacities (smoke signals, radar, etc.); and f3) amplifiers
of human ratiocinative capacities.

This last constitutes the most impor-

tant as well as the most diverse, ranging from language systems to myth and
theory and explanation.
It is these language systems that are most useful, according to
Bruner·, since they constitute a higher form of representation, symbolic
representation.

He noted: "if we are to benefit from contact with recurrent

regularities in the environment, we must represent them in some manner
[p. 2]."

He believed this cannot be explained in terms of simple memory.

These systems of representation are not merely storage systems; they are
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systems of coding, processing, and selective recalling •.
Bruner's position is much closer to the position of Luria and
Vygotsky than is Piaget's.

Although Luria does not speak of symbolic

representation but of speech, he and Bruner sound very much alike.

Luria

(1960) referred to Vygotsky's contribution that the verbal relationship
with the mother plays a decisive role in the further development of the
child.

Gradually the child is able to internalize the controls established

by his mother.

He accomplishes this by acquiring speech.

Luria (1961)

summarized this line of thinking when he stated: "Thus he [the child] becomes capable of actively modifying the environment that influences him;
by using speech for himself, he alters the relative strength of the
stimuli acting upon him, and adapts his behavior to the influences thus
modified [p. 20]."
Bern (1967) investigated Luria's ideas and found evidence that
supported the hypothesis that verbal self-control aids the child to structure his environment.

Bern established verbal self-control in 3-year-olds

and thus enabled them'to perform at a 4-year-old level

a level at which

they were unable to perform prior to,the establis·hment of verbal controls.
Obviously, following this line of thinking leads one to suppose
that a failure to develop this symbolic.mode of representation properly, an
inability to make use of this great tool of language, would result in maladaptive behavior on the part of the child.
An interesting experiment by Mehler and Bever (1967), however, may
cause both sides of the Harvard-Geneva debate to reinterpret their findings.
In a verbal test for conservatio~ of number, Piaget's findings were supported
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when younger children selected the longer row of pellets when asked to
point to the row with "more" pellets, even though that row had fewer pellets
than the shorter row.

When the pellets were replaced by candy M & Ms, how-

ever, and the children were told that they could have the row with more
M & Ms, they chose the correct row, even though it was the shorter of the
two.

In other words, even though the children could not demonstrate con-

servation in the usual manner, they could do so'..i.n a matter of personal
importance to them.
The question still remains concerning the relationship between
cognitive development and emotional functioning.

It may well be that

Arieti presents what could best stand as the Luria-Bruner answer to this
question.
Arieti (1967) has examined many of the "higher level" emotions in
man.

These include love, hate, depression, and so forth.

His position is

that it is man's cognitive functions that constitute the basis of man's
emotions.

In a later article he stated:

Concepts and organized clusters of concepts become depositories
of emotions and also originators of new emotions. They,--bave a
great deal to do with the cohflicts of man, his achievements and
his frustrations, his states of happiness or despair, of anxiety
or of security. They become the repositories of intangible feelings
and values. Not only every concept has an emotional counterpart,
but concepts are necessary for high emotions [1970, pp. 102-103].
Of course, Arieti would not deny that man's emotions play a large
role in his cognitive functioning as well.

On this question he stated

the following:
Emotions and cognitive processes form a circular. process. The
emotional accompaniment of a cognitive process becomes the propelling drive not only toward action but also toward further

,_

..
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cognitive processes. Only emotions can stimulate man to overcome
the hardship of some cognitive processes and lead to complicated
symbolic, interpersonal and abstract processes. On the other
hand, only cognitive processes can extend indefinitely the realm
of emotions [1970, p. 103).
As is obvious, Arieti lays great stress on the role that cognition
plays in man's intrapsychic life.
that language occupies.

He furthermore emphasizes the position

According to him the. "high level" emotions pre-

suppose the existence of verbal symbols.

While Luria and Bruner might not

agree with all that Arieti says, it is probable that they would accept
his emphasis on cognition and, even more so, his emphasis on the role of
language.
Eri,k.son, for instance, has formulated several notions about children between the ages of seven and eleven.

It is during this

pe~iod

that

the child, having realized that he cannot immediately do the things an
adult does, begins to develop a sense of industry in order to fend off a
sense of inferiority.

As Erikson (in Maier, 1965) sees it, the child

delves diligently into all opportunities to learn by doing and experiments
with the rudimentary skills required by his culture.
\

his culture's tools and symbols, the child_

se~ms

to understand that this

sort of learning will help him to become more himself.
;

As he learns to wield

.

It seems to follow

.

from this line of reasoning that failure of such learning might result
in some sort of maladjustment.
White (1963) develops the idea that a child is motivated to master
his environment--at least to the point of being able to influence it.· A
significant part of his environment is the social setting in which he
grows up and his most effective method would be language.

Success in such
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endeavors leads to what White terms a "feeling of efficacy."
Several studies have suggested that motivational factors may be
associated with impairment in cognitive development.

Freibergs and

Douglas (1969) studied concept learning in normal and hyperactive children.
They found that the hyperactive children did more poorly than the normal
children during certain schedules of reinforcement.

They suggested that

the hyperactive children's performance decrement's· are more attributable to
attentional and motivational variables than to global, cognitive-conceptual
impairments.

Reger (1964) also addressed himself to this problem and

attempted to assess the relationship between emotional disturbance and
abstract thinking level in children.

He used as subjects emotionally

disturbed and/or mentally retarded boys.

By using the Goldstein-Scheerer

Object Sorting Test and ratings of the children's adjustment, he found that
there was a negative relationship indicating that lower levels of abstract
thinking were associated with higher degrees of emotional disturbance.

While

his design leaves much to be desired, his findings did support the hypothesis
that impaired language ability and emotional dysfunction are associated.
Rimoldi and his collaborators have ¢lone extensive research in
children's thinking, and the method he developed lends itself very well to
the questions at hand.

r'

Moreover, one of his pecent concerns has been

thinking and language and their relationship (1967a, 1967b).

He has

adapted concepts from the algebra of transformations to formulate and express his thinking on. this subject.

What he suggested is that "the type of

correspondence that exists between a given language and logical structures
is of interest in defining the precision and completeness of a language

14

[1967b, p. 18]."
While Piaget and Bruner seem to be more concerned about developmental psychology and the role that language may or may not play with regard
to a child's cognitive development, Rimoldi's appears to be more interested
in the effects of language on thinking in general.

Thus, Rimoldi proposed

that if one language component corresponds to several logical components,
uncertainty is at a maximum.

He added the interesting note that "This

may occur with ordinary language at the early stages of development or in
the deterioration due to ageing or pathological conditions [1967a, p. 28]."
Rimoldi further stated that a greater degree of precision is to be
had when each language component corresponds to one and only one logical
component.

Even with this, the same logical component may be expressed

by several different language components.
ordinary everyday verbal language.
"one-one" languages.

This, Rimoldi feels, may represent

The most precise languages are the
I

With these there is an exact correspondence between

each language component and each logical component.

This is similar to

knowing an exact function in algebra that can be used to find either x or y
when the other is known.

The transf6rmation that obtains in ordinary lan-

guage is a "many-one" type of transformation.

That is, many language

components may correspond to a single logical component.
Rimoldi's formulation suggests that what exists in primitive or
pathological cases is a "one-many" type of _transformation.

While this may

at first glance appear to be the opposite of what was being said concerning
abstraction and the emotionally disturbed, it actually is not.

..

What is being

implied here is that the pathological individual, in contrast to the normal
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individual, cannot make a true categorization on an abstract level.

In

other words, normal individuals can form concepts that allow them to
organize their world.

What happens with the pathological cases is that

organization is attempted, but due to something, such as a lack of abstracting
ability, the transformation results in a one-many type.

That is, uncertainty

and ambiguity are at their highest level.
In addition to conceptualization at a highly theoretical level~
Rimoldi has also contributed a unique methodology for investigating cognitive
processes.

While it is apparent that various differences in the cognitive

functioning of normal and maladjusted persons might be anticipated, there
is a .paucity of research which throws light on the hypothesized differences
between the cognitive process of the two groups.
Much of the research in the area of cognition has evolved from the
S-R (stimulus-response) school of psychology.

As such, it concentrated

on what could be termed the end product of an individual's/cognitive process--the final answer.

This approach chooses to ignore what goes on in

the mediating process-, the "black box," as it is termed.
Rimoldi (1955, 1961), however, has pointed out repeatedly that the
same response may be reached through different processes and therefore the
study of the response itself does not bring out the variety of ~ndividual
differences that no doubt exist.

What is more important for Rimoldi is to

investigate this process, to monitor what goes on when a person engages
in intellectual activity.
As a final note to the question of S-R "product" approach versus the
"Process" approach Levitt (1968), in examining them both, declared the

. 16
"process" approach superior in that it focuses on the individual's organization of incoming information and in his transactions with the environment.
A question that must be answered, of course, is just what is this
mental activity.

Rimoldi (1967b) offers a brief description of thinking.

"In a restricted sense, thinking could be understood as an attempt to make
explicit and communicable (to one's self or to others) the formal properties
of a problem [p. 15]."
Luria (1966) gave a more complete description of the process:
As has been repeatedly mentioned, intellectual activity is a particularly complex form of mental activity, taking place only when
the problem demands preliminary analysis and synthesis of the situation and special auxiliary operations by means of which it can be
solved. Any investigation of the intellectual processes must
therefore create a situation in which the subject has no readymade, previously established means of attaining the desired goal
and in which he must analyze this situation, picking out its
essential components and correlating them with each other, formulate hypotheses, develop a "strategy," and select definite operations or tactical methods for its realization [p. 448].
It is surprising how closely Luria's description of intellectual
activity mirrors Rimoldi's method of studying problem solving.

Luria (1966)

also spoke of problem solving:
'lintellectual activity assumes its most di~tinct and highly developed
form in other operations--in discursive intellectual activity and
in the solutions of problems. It is in these activities that the
basic structure of the intellectual processes is seen especially
clearly. The person solving a problem must analyze its requirements,
select the essential relationships, and discover the intermediate
aims and the operations by which these aims may be secured. Only
by carrying through intermediate operations of this nature can he
reach a final solution to the problem [p. 463].
1

This review has sought to investigate some of the different opinions
that exist concerning the relationship between

cogn~tion

and emotionality.

We have seen that both aspects of an individual appear to be intimately

.D

linked and interdependent.

A. further question arose in the shape of what

part language plays, especially in cognitive development •. While the
Genevan school feels that language is a secondary step in the child's
development, Bruner, following Luria and Vygotsky, insist that language
is essential·as a major tool for development.

Rimoldi's work has demon-

strated that certain languages or levels of language are necessary before
one can solve certain problems and that the methodology of choice is one
that concentrates on the.process rather than the product of cognition.

Chapter III
Method
Subjects
The original sample of emotionally disturbed boys consisted of
32 boys between the ages of 9 and 12 years of age who had been presented
to four various institutions in the Chicago area because of their maladap•
tive behavior at home and at school. All of these subjects were either
being screened for acceptance for psychotherapy or were in the early stages
of treatment.
The criteria for their selection, aside from age, were as follows:
(1)

their primary diagnosis did not involve organic brain damage.

A few

of the subjects carried diagnoses of visual-perceptual handicaps, but these
were secondary diagnoses and considered to be minimal.

None of the subjects

was observed to experience any difficulty 1n perceiving the test materials.
(2) Their functioning intelligence must be such as to allow them to grasp
the nature of the tasks set them and to attempt to formulate an answer.

This

criterion was judged to be met if a subject received an intelligence quotient

of

80 or more on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test.

(3) Their

behavior must not be such as to make it impossible for them to attend to the
tasks given them in the testing situation.
Of the 32 boys tested, 5 failed to meet the second criterion and
3 failed to meet the third.

It was possible to eliminate boys who failed
8
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to meet the first requirement prior to actually testing them.

As a result

only 24 boys were actually used in this study.
The nondisturbed sample was gathered from primary schools in the
Chicago area.

These were 24 boys between the ages of 9 and 12 years with

no known psychiatric disorder who volunteered to solve the problems.
two groups

we~e

matched for age and intelligence.

terizing the two samples are presented in Table 1.

The

Descriptive data characSignificance tests

indicated there was no difference between the samples.
Measures
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) was used to ascertain
the I.Q. for each boy in the disturbed sample.

The

I~Q.

scores for the

normal sample were obtained from Otis group intelligence tests that had been
administered within the year.
The PPVT was used with the disturbed group because it was possible
to ascertain the individual's "use" vocabulary by it (Anastasi, 1968).
Solving the Rimoldi problems depends in good part on a sufficient level of
receptive language ability and since this is one of the factors the PPVT
\

tests best, this constituted another reason why this instrument was chosen.
Furthermore, the PPVT has been used previously with emotionally disturbed
children and has also been found to correlate rather well with group intelligence tests, especially ones high in verbal loadings (Anastasi).
Moss and Edmonds (1960) found that,with a sample of British children the
PPVT and the Otis correlated at .68.
The problems used in this study are presented in Appendix A.

These

problems were developed by the Loyola Psychometric Laboratory in connection
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Table l
Mean, Standard Deviation
And Range For Age and I.Q.
In Disturbed And Normal Samples
And Tests for Significance of Differences

Group
N

Disturbed

24

M

9.71

Age
SD
0.96

I.Q • .

Range

t

9 - 12

M

~

Range

93.92 11.76 82-118
. 0.18

Normal

24

9.78

t values nonsignif icant

1.08

9 - 12

t

0.64
91.53

5.09 85-103

\

•

21

with a government sponsored project investigating problem solving in elementary school boys.

They are modifications of problems which Rimoldi and his

collaborators have been investigating for a number of years under various
conditions (1955, 1961) and for different age groups (1962,

196~a,

1967b).

Aside from the sample problems there were six problems administered
to each subject.

These problems varied along two dimensions, internal

complexity and the abstractness of the language in which they were presented.
Internal complexity of the problem refers to the structure of the
different problems used.
employed.

In this study only two different structures were

These structures are designated by numbers, 31 referring to a

more simple structure and 35 to a more complex one.

The structure of

problems in the 31 series is represented graphically in Figure 1 and the
structure of the 35 series is pictured in Figure 2.
The structure of the problems and their

correspond~ng

may be best thought of in terms of information theory.

complexities

Problems in the 31

series have fewer alternatives than those of the 35 series to be investigated prior to arriving at an answer and thus these problems may be said
\

to demand fewer bits of information for their solution.

It is for this

reason that the 31 series is said to be less complex than the 35 series and
it is assumed that the 31 series is therefore easier to solve.
The language of the problems refers to the level of concretenessabstractness used in the presentation of the problem.

There were three

levels of language abstractness used in this investigation: Picture language,
designated P; concrete verbal language, designated A; and abstract verbal
language, designated B.

Thus, a problem designated 31B would indicate the

2.2

D

B

A
D

c
E

\

Figure 1.

Logical structure of the· 11 3111 series p,roblems.
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A

Figure 2.

Logical structure of the "35" series problems.
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logical structure of the 31 series and the verbal abstract presentation.
In the picture series the problems were presented with actual pietures representing the various alternative to be used in arriving at a
solution.

In the concrete verbal series the language used was what might

be termed an everyday language.

The problems were

presented~

for example,

in terms of horses, black horses.and white horses,and the like.

In the

verbal abstract series the concrete language is replaced by rather abstract
symbol~

such as the letters of the alphabet.
An assumption, supported by the results of problem solving pro-

cesses of elementary school boys (Rimoldi et.aL, 1970), is that the problems
are most difficult when presented in the verbal abstract language.

Thus,

by using six problems it was possible to present both structures in each
of the three "languages."

The problems in the 31 series, then, were iso-

morphic with regards to their structure and varied only in the Language
used to present them.

The same is true of the 35 series.

At least two sample problems were also used, one for the picture
-,
presentation and one for the verbal presentation. Their logical structure,
I

however, was even more simple than the 31 series.
As the subject worked each problems the experimenter recorded which
questions he used and the order in which he used them.

This sequence of

questions formed the individual's tactic for that particular problem.
Although the answer that the subject finally gave was also recorded it
was the tactic dnd not the subject's answer that was scored.

Through this

metnod it was possible to attend to the process rather than merely to the
final product of the process.

25

The questions that the subject had av.ailable to him could be categorized into three classes: relevant and pertinent, relevant but non-pertinent
and irrelevant.

The first category of questions imparted useful information

to the subject about the problem he was trying to solve.

The second class,

relevant but non-pertinent, contained information which pertained to the
actual problem at hand but which did not really aid in solving it.

Some-

times the information contained in these questions was redundant and sometimes it was simply unnecessary.
were simply that.

The final category, irrelevant questions,

Questions which had no relevance to the problem and

which therefore imparted no usable information toward its solution.
The scoring method used in this study is the same as used by
Rimoldi (Rimoldi et.al., 1970).

As stated therein, this particular method

is a refinement and a redefinition that resulted from the comparison of
twenty different scoring methods by one of his assistants.

The technical

details of this scoring method are given in Appendix B.
The method considers how each tactic approximates the logical
structure of the problem.

This implies, in terms of information theory,

eliminating the greatest number of alternatives
uncertainty at each opportunity.

o~

maximally reducing the

Therefore, the first question asked

should remove the greatest uncertainty while the later questions should deal
with more specific alternatives.

As a result, the ideal tactic fulfills

these requirements: "Maximum correspondence between the generality of the
question and its position in the tactic with the minimum number of questions
that exhaust the information necessary to solve the problem [Rimoldi et al.,
1970, P• 34]."
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In the scoring system used, these ideal tactics obtain the maximum
score.

Scores are lower to the degree that they vary from the ideal

tactic (i.e., if there are reversals in order, irrelevancy, failure to
choose the meaningful questions, etc.).

Scores may vary from +l.00 to

-l.OO, with +l.00 representing the maximum score for the ideal tactic.
Procedure
Previous research (Rimoldi, Aghi, & Burger, 1968) indicated that the
length of testing for normal subjects should not exceed l 1/2 hours.

On

the basis of this it was decided that the more realistic limit for emotionally disturbed children would be approximately l hour.

This limitation was

kept in mind in designing the research and it was felt that for the most
part the subjects were able to work for that period.

Occasionally rest

periods, trips to the water fountain and the like, were taken.

Two of

the subjects in the disturbed sample could not finish because they felt
they were too tired and one boy failed to finish when he began to hallucinate
in the midst of the testing session.

As noted previously, the data from

these subjects were not included in the results.
Each disturbed subject was t~sted individually in an office of the
institution.with which he was familiar.

In practically all instances a

staff member of the institution introduced the subject to the experimenter
and explained that he had some puzzles for the boy to work on.
Each disturbed subject was first given the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test.

In addition to providing an I.Q. score for ) each boy this test

was found to be nonthreatening and therefore facilitated the establishment
of rapport between the subject and the tester.

27

Each subject was then given a sample of the picture type problem.

Th• ia1k wa• expla1n•d io h1M •n4 h• ••• help•d, 1f n•o•11ary, io work h11
way through this sample problem.

If he failed to grasp the nature of the

task or was unable to do the problem, the sample problem was worked for
him and the procedure explained to him.
problem to attempt on his own.
at this point.

He was then given a second sample

If he failed this, testing was discontinued

If the subject demonstrated that he comprehended what the

test was and an ability to perform it, the first picture language problem,
~roblem

31P, was then administered.

This was followed by problem 35P.

This completed the picture language series of problems.
The mode of presentation for the picture problems was as follows.
The subject was informed by the examiner, in some fictionalized story
fashion, that he must attempt to decide what the correct alternative was,
given all the various choices.

For instance, the subject might be told

that "Johnie has round blocks and square blocks; he has white blocks and
he has blue blocks.

What kind of blocks does Johnie like best?"

The

various alternatives were always listed several times as well as all the
combinations such as white round blocks, blue round blocks.
The subject was then shown pictures of various combinations of
blocks.

He could then ask the examiner if the object in question was one

of the things pictured on a particular card.· The subject was informed that
he should ask only those questions. that he actually needed.

The examiner

would answer the subject, set the card apart so the subject could tell he
had asked about it, and mark down which card the subject had asked about.
The "correct" alternative was never pictured on any of the cards, so that
I

,
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it was necessary for the subject to first rule out all the other alternatives and then form the conclusion that it must be the only one left.

It

was occasionally necessary to verbalize this for some of the subjects who
were obviously aware that they had eliminated all the alternatives except
one and yet were somewhat upset by the fact that that alternative was
not pictured anywhere.
In a previously cited study (Rimoldi et al., 1970) involving several
hundred boys, a subject occasionally caught on that the answer was simply
the missing alternative.
study.

This phenomenon did not seem to occur in this

In fact, even when it did occur in the larger study it was simple

enough to ask the subject which cards he would have to pick to make sure
that his hunch was really the right answer.
When he had finished the picture series of problems the subject
was then given a sample verbal problem.

These sample problems were similar

in design to the actual problem except that they had fewer bits of information to work with.

Most subjects seemed to experience less difficulty

in grasping what was expected of them when the verbal problems were presented.
In the verbal series the boy was first given a 3 X 5 index card
with the problem printed on it.

The experimenter read through this problem

with the subject, trying to make sure that the subject understood what he
was expected to answer.

Then 10 more 3 X 5 cards were shown the subject.

On the front of each of these cards there was a question.

The answer to

some of these questions contained bits of information useful in solving
the problem.

The answers to the questions were on the back side of the
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cards.

These cards were explained as clues or questions that the subject

might wish to ask to help .solve the puzzle.

The experimenter read each

of the cards with the subject and then read the problem again.
To solve the problem the subject would then have to decide which
cards he would have to use.

Once he had decided on a particular card or

question he could obtain the answer for it by simply turning the card
over.

On the back of each card the question was/repeated and its answer

was given.

\

•

Chapter IV
Results
Each subject in this study was administered six problems in addition
to the sample problems.

These problems varied in internal complexity and

in the mode of presentation or "language."

Internal complexity refers to

the number of bits of information that the individual must process before
arriving at an answer.

There were two structures presented in this

dimension, a simple type of problem referred to as the "31" series,1 and a
more complex one referred to as the "35" series.
The mode of presentation or language refers to the degree of abstractness in which the problem was presented.

This continuum varied

from presenting the problems in picture form to presenting them in concrete
verbal form and, finally, to presenting them in abstract terms in which
objects are designated by such symbols as letters of the alphabet.

The

letter "P" represents the picture mode of presentation, the letter "A" the
concrete verbal language, and the letter "B" symbolizes the abstract language.

Thus, problem 31A indicates a type of problem in the more simple

series and one that was presented in concrete, everyday language.
The mean score and standard deviation for each problem obtained
by each group of boys, normal and disturbed, is presented in Table 2.
These mean scores are plotted in Figure 3.
30

The mean scores of the disturbed
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Table 2
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations
for Problems Administered to Both Samples

Sample

Problem
Normal
Structure

Mode of
Presentation Code

Disturbed

M

SD

M

SD

Simple

Picture

31P

0.484

0.199

0.732

0.352

Complex

Picture

35P

0.565

0.401

0.490

0.476

Simple

Concrete
Verbal

31A

0.317

0.408

-0.017

0.400

Complex

Concrete
Verbal

35A

0.227

0.265

-0.121

0.429

Simple .

Abstract
Verbal ,

31B

0.206

0.297

-0.146

0.374

Complex

Abstract
Verbal

3SB

0.084

0.308

-0.175

0.260

I
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Mean problem solving scores for each problem
for the distUI"bed and normal groups.
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and the matched normal groups, were analyzed statistically by a 2 X 3 X 2
analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last two variables
(Winer, 1962).

The results of this analysis (Table 3) confirm what is

indicated by Figure 3.

The performances of the two groups are different at

a statistically significant level.

Furthermore, the differences of the

various language scores were significant at less than the .01 level while
the difference between the two structures was significant at the .OS
level.
To further investigate these differences between and within the two

,.

groups, Scheffe intervals were calculated.

Since the original analysis of

variance indicated that there was no significant interaction effect between
the complexity and language (B X C interaction), the results were collapsed
on the complexity variable prior to calculating the intervals.
intervals are presented in Table 3.

,

These

Inspection of the Scheffe intervals

shows that within the groups the major difference is between the performance on the picture problems and the performance on the verbal problems.
However, the difference between ·the two groups in terms of their performances on the picture problems was not significant.
Finally, the scores for the two types of verbal problems, concrete
and abstract, differed significantly between the two groups but not within
either group.

That is, the subjects within each group performed as well

on the abstract language as they did on the concrete language, but the
overall performance level of the normal group was higher than that of the

~~\S TOW~I}:>

disturbed group.

I"

\

-

•

LOYOLA

·~

,. ,.- .... ~ITV

\S\
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance
of Problem Solving Scores
For Normal and Disturbed Samples

df

Mean
SQuare

1

2.512

46

0.394

Within
Languages (B)

2

8.927

89.270**

Ax B

2

1.394

13.940**

B x Ss
Within Groups

92

0.100

Structure (C)

l

0.514

9.018**

Ax C

l

0.120

2.105

Source of
Variation
Between Groups (A)
Ss Within Groups

F

6.376*

\

C x Ss
Within Groups

46

0.057

c

2

0.043

0.597

Ax B x C

2

0.239

3.319*

Bx

BC x Ss
Within Groups

• ~
•• 2.

.os
.01

•

92

0.072

•
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Table 4
Significance of Differences Between Problems
Within and Between Normal and Disturbed Samples

Comparison
Group(s)

Language(s)

Disturbed

Picture

Disturbed

Scheffe Interval

Group(s)

Language(s)

vs.

Disturbed

Concrete

+0.941

+l. 789*

Picture

vs.

Disturbed

Abstract

+1.115

+1.973*

Disturbed

Picture

vs.

Normal

Picture

-0.255

+0.603

Disturbed

Picture

vs.

Normal

Concrete

+0.264

+1.112*

Disturbed

Picture

vs.

Normal

Abstract

+0.503

+1.361*

Disturbed

Concrete

vs.

Disturbed

Abstract

-0.245

+0.613

Disturbed

Concrete

vs.

Normal

Picture

+o. 757

+1.615

Disturbed

Concrete

vs.

Normal

Concrete

+0.254

+1.112*

Disturb~d

Concrete

vs.

Normal

Abstract

-0.001

+0.857

Disturbed

Abstrac~ ..

vs.

Normal

Picture

+0.941

+l. 799*

Disturbed

Abstract

vs.

Normal

Concrete

+0.438

+l.295*

Disturbed

Abstract

vs.

Normal

Abstract

+0.183

+l.041*

I

\

Normal

. Picture

vs.

Normal

Concrete

·. +0.074

+0.932*

Normal

Picture

vs.

Normal

Abstract

+0.329

+1.187*

Normal

Concrete

vs.

Normal

Abstract

-0.174

+0.684

Both

Picture

vs.

Both

Concrete
Abstract

+0.768

+1.312*

* p

.01
I

.

&
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The performance of the two groups scored simply on the correctness
of their final answers is plotted in Figure 4.

Tests of significance

indicated that the two samples cannot be differentiated on the basis of
the

fina~

answers alone.

Previous research (Rimoldi et al., 1970) indicated that further
analysis of the data for the disturbed group might be relevant in terms
of age differences.

As a result of their study of a large group of nondis-

turbed boys, they concluded: "In summary all the comparisons performed
seem to indicate that at about 10 to 11 years of age there is definite
improvement in performance in the VA [verbal concrete] problems so that
two relatively homogeneous subsamples could be defined below and above
this age level [p. 47]."
In order to investigate these two subsamples, the present disturbed
group was subdivided into two groups according to age.

Nine and 10-year-

old boys in one group, 11 and 12-year-old boys in the other.

The results

for these two groups were treated statistically by an analysis of variance,
again a 2 X 3 X 2 with repeated measures.
Table 4.

The results are presented in

The mean scores of these two subsamples· are also plotted in

Figure 5.
As was previously indicated, there is a significant difference
between the two age groups.

Not only was the overall performance of the

older group superior, but its pattern was different from the younger group.
The difference in this pattern

can be seen more easily if the mean scores

of the two groups are plotted according to the problem structure rather
than language.

This is done in Figure 6 and it can be observed that the
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Table :5
Analysis of Variance
of Problem Solving Scores
For Younger and Older Disturbed Boys

df

Mean
Square

1

3.000

22

0.344

Within
Languages (B)

2

8.497

61.129**

Ax B

2

0.155

1.115

B x Ss
WithTn Groups

44

0.139

Structure (C)

l\

0.49$

12.073**

1

0.153

3. 7'32

22

0.041

Bx C

2

0.174

2.597

Ax Bx C

2

0.320

4. 776*

44

0.067

Source of
Variation

-

Between Groups (A)
Ss within Groups

Ax C
C x Ss
WithTn Groups

BC x Ss
Within Groups
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Mean problem solving scores for younger and older
disturbed subsamples: problems arranged by structure.

older group coped with the more simple structure (31) far more easily
than the younger group.

Furthermore, while it can be seen that the

younger group could not handle the verbal language no matter which structure was presented, the older group could deal with the verbal presentation as long as .the structure was simple (31).

'/

Chapter .V
Discussion
The obtained results give rise to some interesting questions.
Very briefly, these results indicated that a sample of emotionally disturbed boys can solve problems as well as a nondisturbed sample as long
as the problems are presented to them in picture fashion.

When the same

type of problems are presented in verbal terms, however, the performance
level of the disturbed sample falls far below that of the normal sample.
The question that comes most immediately to mind is why should the
performance level of the disturbed sample drop so drastically when the
problems are presented verbally?

It is hoped that a discussion of these

results in the light of the theories reviewed previously will offer an
answer to this and other questions.
Bruner, in formulating his theories about cognition in children,
has been impressed by the findings of anthropologists that

~he

changes in man have been alloplastic rather than autoplastic.

principal
For instance,

man's complex brain evolved due to new selection after bipedalism and consequent upon the.use of tools.

Bruner argues that man did not simply evolve

a larger brain than his predecessor and then begin to walk upright and use
tools.

From this he further argues that man has effected his changes

through the use of various systems, of which one of the most important
42
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and complex is language.

Following this line of thought led him to the

conclusion that language is a tool of major importance in the development
of an individual.

It is not merely a means of communicating with his fellow

man, it is far more important than that.

It is through language that an

individual is able to organize and master his environment.

Bruner (1964)

stated: "In effect, language provides a means, not only for.representing
experience, but also for transforming it • • • • , Once the child has succeeded
in internalizing language as a cognitive instrument, it becomes possible
for him to represent and systematically transform the regularities of
experience with far greater flexibility and power than before [p. 4]."
Some of the implications of this contention bear looking into.

One

could speculate, for instance, what would be the results if, for some
reason, a child failed to master language adequately.

I am not referring

to a deaf child, for whom there are special problems in communicating, but
to a child who hears but fails to comprehend; who misunderstands and is
unable to make himself understood; who is confused and in turn confuses.
He would either fail to generate a set of laws whereby he could organize
his environment and thus be faced with a chaotic world, or he would quite
likely formulate his own unique set of laws.

In either event, his behavior

would surely be viewed as maladaptive and disturbed by the rest of society.
On the other side of the coin, of course, is the individual who is
presumed to be disturbed for some reason other than failing to master
language·.

If this individual would be hyperactive and distractible or spme-

what alienated from those around him it is more than likely that he would
find it difficult or undesirable to make the effort to master language.
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.It is quite possible, of course, that these two cycles foster each
other, and as the disturbed individual falters in his development of language his information becomes increasingly meaningless and inadequate.
This in turn may bring about a more maladaptive adjustment on his part.
Although it is nearly impossible to decide at present which process might
be responsible for starting such a cycle, some current research will
shortly be discussed that may provide some clues.
The point to be stressed is that the results of this investigation
are quite compatible with what Bruner is thinking.

That is, disturbed

children manifest an inability to work with verbal symbols.
In Chapter II it was seen that Piaget and Bruner hold different
views of the role of language.

While the results give some support to the

Harvard school they cannot be interpreted as disproving the Genevan school.
For although Piaget postulates different mechanisms of cognitive development he does not fail to appreciate the importance of language.

Sinclair

(in Furth, 1969) perh?ps expressed the Genevan position on the role of
language as well as anyone else.

Language can direct attention to per-

tinent factors of a problem, just as 'it can control perceptual activities,
as Luria and his collaborators have shown.

In this way, language can

prepare an operation but it is neither sufficient nor necessary to the
formation of concrete operations [p. 130]."
In an attempt to resolve their differences Piaget and his collaborators have performed a number of experiments aimed at investigating Bruner's
contention that language does far more than simply direct attention or
control perceptual activities.

One of these studies (Inhelder, Bovet,
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Sinclair, and Smock, 1966) sought to teach children who did not have the
concept of conservation to use language expressions found to be characteristic of children with conservation.

They did this with concepts of in-

creasing complexity in terms of number, quantities, and dimensions.

One of

the aims of this experiment was to see whether performance on conservation
tasks could be improved through systematic teaching of the language of
description appropriate to that particular concept.
Their conclusion from this experiment was, in part, as follows:
Our evidence offers little, if any, support for the contention
that language learning per se contributes to the integration and
coordination of "informational units" necessary for the achievement
of the conservation concepts • • • • Language learning does not
provide, in our opinion, a ready-made "lattice" or lens which
organizes the child's perceptual world [p. 163].
Something to be noted about this investigation is that at its
inception the children lacked certain verbal proficiencies.

It is con-

ceivable, then, that the attempt to teach them certain verbal concepts
through other verbal means may have amounted to attempting to teach one
unknown by another unknown.

Although the analogy limps, it is possible

that what they were doing was similar to trying to teach the color green
to a blind person by telling him it is make up of blue and yellow.

What

might have been more apropos would have been to allow the child to learn
the concept himself while working with some medium other than words.

For-

tunately such an experiment has been performed.
Gelman (in Trabasso, 1968) wor.ked with normal children who did not
have the concept of conservation.

Gelman's hypothesis was that perhaps

these children fail to conserve as a result of some perceptual fixation,
not because as Pia et would sa

have not

et achieved the ro er
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cognitive structure and were therefore unable to perform the logical
operations needed for conservation.

Her approach was to train the child

to ignore irrelevant changes and to pay attention to factors that do not
change.

This was done, for example, by presenting stimuli that differed

in many ways, such as rods of different color, size, shape, and length,
and asking the child to pick the two rods that were different from the
third.

The results of two days of such training were that 94 pe~ent of

the children responded correctly to tests of conservation.

Interestingly,

•

a control group that received similar training, except that they did not
receive any feedback as to the correctness of their choices during training,
responded correctly only 25 percent of the time.

Gelman interpreted

these findings as supportive of her hypothesis.
It is possible that one of the reasons Gelman was successful in
teaching conservation was that she had made use of nonverbal media.
Dykman, Walls, Suzuki, Ackerman, and Peters (1970) provide a clue as to the
importance of not relying too heavily on verbal input alone.

Their inves-

tigation of children with learning disabilities suggested to them that
\

these children take almost l/10 of a second longer than average to process
a single bit of information.

As they pointed out, normal conversation

contains approximately 9 bits of information per second.

At this rate

children with learning disabilities could be completely lost in a matter
of seconds.

While their study indicated that speed of input was a

crucial factor, the present study seems to indicate that a large number
of verbal bits of information is too much even if the task at hand is not
a timed one.

A point to be noted is that when many of the bits of
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information are presented in picture fashion the subjects did much better.
We have seen the importance Bruner places on language and can easily surmis~

the explanation he might offer.

But what might Piaget say?

The article cited above (Dykman et al., 1970) pointed out that
Piaget long ago noted that young children tend to speak to themselves not
only when alone but while with others.

Piaget (1924) distinguished be-

tween egocentric speech and socialized speech.

The former is usually

replaced by the latter during the early school years.

Dykman and his co-

workers assume that as egocentric speech disappears the individual's
inner speech progressively condenses into single words or eveu fragments
of words.

They feel that these units accomplish in thought what sentences

and phrases accomplished earlier.

"Condensation helps the child to think

rapidly and a child whose inner speech is well developed should be able to
process information more rapidly and react more quickly than a child who
is slow in this development [Dykman et al. 1970, p. 779]."
Vygotsky (1962) has explicated the notion that egocentric speech
does not merely cease but that it becomes the inner speech referred to
above.

He further pointed out that during problem-solving tasks the ego•

centric speech of children increased in occurrence.
While Gelman did not report anything along these lines, it is
possible that her success in teaching conservation was due, in part, to
allowing children to proceed at a rate and with a medium (other than verbal) which allowed them to not only process the information but to formulate
in their own way their inner speech necessary for the problem.
The results of these studies lead to some interesting implications
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for dealing with children, especially with those that might be called
disturbed or maladaptive.

One such implication would be that it may be

far better to attempt to communicate with such a child in a medium that he
can process and understand rather than to insist upon his immediately
learning our way of communicating.
a child might take on many

This attempt to communicate with such

approaches~

It would not only use nonverbal as

well as verbal means, but it would also transmit information at a rate at
which he could assimilate it.

One such approach appears to be in use

already in the form of behavior modification therapy.

In tRis approach

a good deal of communication to the child is done in nonverbal fashion, such
as presenting him with rewards like M & Ms.

Furthermore, even the verbal

communication in this approach is quite likely to be rather simple and
easily comprehended.

The messages are often consciously broken down into

smaller units that may be more easily grasped.
Another_desirable factor that behavior modification therapy can
readily incorporate is encouraging these children to use verbal media for
communication even if they should fail in many of their attempts.

What

I

can be seen in such children is an overdependence on nonverbal means and a
fear of attempting such complex and difficult
language can offer.

mod~sof

communication as

In behavior modification approaches this encouraging

of the use of language can be dealt with in the form of shaping an individual's behavior and having him gradually approximate a desired behavior
such as using language.
Perhaps an even further refinement on this approach is to couple it,
in dealing with certain children, with the use of sign language.

This
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would serve two purposes.

For one thing, it would most probably slow down

the one who is doing the communicating and this in itself, according to
the study cited above (Dykman et al., 1970) would have a very beneficial
effect.

The child would be given information at a slower rate and pre-

sumably would be able to process it and keep up with it more easily.
Another aspect of sign language is that it appears to be almost an intermediate step between verbal and nonverbal communications.

Thus, if the

goal is to aid an individual to make the transition from nonverbal to
verbal communication the choice of an apt intermediate step is essential.
With sign language the child can easily visualize what is being done and
yet is forced to gradually incorporate verbal symbolizations.

Presumably,

gaining facility in doing this in a manner and at a speed which they can
comprehend will allow them the confidence to attempt more and more actual
verbal communication.
There is one final factor to be discussed.

Although it has been

mentioned before that the relationship between maladaptive behavior and
verbal ability is circular, there is still the question of which process
begins the cycle.

That is, does a child develop maladaptive behavior

patterns because of an inability to master language, or does some personality disturbance bring about this inability?
At present it is impossible to state definitively which process
initiates the cycle and it may be that this question can never be solved.
In fact, it may not even be a legitimate question.

It is possible that

for some individuals it is one process and for others it is the reverse.
Nonetheless there are some interesting studies currently being
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conducted that may shed some light on this.

Dykman and his coworkers

(Dykman et al., 197.0), for example, have concluded that children who are
classified as having learning disabilities do not have trouble because of
motivational or other similar difficulties.

They hypothesize that the

critical variable in such children is the nervous system which is less
efficient in at least one kind of arousal, i.e. that which is necessary
for the assimilation of symbolic information.

On the basis of neurophysi-

ology they contend that the reticular formation is the structure most
likely to hold the answers to these questions.

To date they have no hard

evidence that the reticular formation in such children is indeed dysfunctioning although they have reported that children with learning disabilities
are more reactive physiologically.
Interestingly enough, other researchers (Ornitz .& Ritvo, 1968; Ritvo,
Ornitz, Evitar, Markham, & Brown, 1969; Ornitz, 1970) have established some
evidence for neurophysiological dysfunction, at least in autistic children.
Although they located the dysfunction in the vestibular system rather
than the reticular formation, this in no way disproves.Dykman's contentions
and in fact supports them.
Of course, even demonstrating that these children have neurological
dysfunction that inhibits the acquisition of language would not in and of
itself prove that this is what causes their emotional disturbance.

In

other words, it could still be argued that the emotional disturbance was
primary and produced neurological dysfunction secondarily.

Nevertheless,

the presence of neurological dysfunction certainly adds much weight to the
arguments of Vygotsky, Luria, Bruner and others like them who claim that
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language is of major importance.

While their theories are plausible, it

is precisely this kind of evidence that must be had to support those
theories.

It will be interesting to see what the advances in theory and

technique produce in this area in the near future •

.

'.

\

Chapter VI
Summary
There has been a paucity of research performed in the field of
cognition as it pertains to man's psychic development.
Arieti (1970) have deplored this neglect.

Writers such as

The present study investigated

certain aspects of cognitive functioning among emotionally disturbed and
normal boys.
Both the Genevan and the Harvard schools have performed extensive
studies of cognitive development.

They offered different· interpretations,

however, of the mechanisms by which cognitive growth occurs.

Piaget (1969)

proposed two mechanisms by which this takes place, accommodation and assimilation.

Bruner (1966) placed more emphasis on the role of language in

development.
Both schools would expect that emotionally disturbed children would
demonstrate deficiencies in their language abilities.

Bruner would imply

that it was this deficiency that was contributing to an individual's
emotional disturbance, i.e., if the individual could not make use of
language to

orga~ize

his world, he would exhibit maladaptive behavior.

His reasoning follows that of Luria (1961).
Piaget, on the other hand, would more easily maintain that the
52
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individual simply had not matured sufficiently to allow him proper command
of language.
Rimoldi (l967a) has also devoted considerable effort in investigating the relationships between language, thinking, and logical structure.
His research has given strong indications that there are relationships
between what structures can be handled and what languages are available.
He has also contributed a qnique methodology for 'studying cognitive functioning through problem solving.

Rimoldi's method was employed in this

research.
A sample of 32 boys between the ages of 9 and 12 years of age who
had been presented to four institutions in the Chicago area as being too
disturbed to cope with school and home without psychiatric help were
tested by this method.

Another sample of boys who were matched to the

disturbed sample in age and I.Q. but were not known to have any psychiatric
problem were also administered the same problems.
The presentation of these problems varied in terms of abstract,

ness-concreteness.
complex.

The internal structure also varied from less to more

The score for each boy was'based on how· he went about solving

the problem although the correctness of his final answer was also considered.
The analyses of the data revealed that the disturbed group performed significantly more poorly than the,nondisturbed sample.

Furthermore,

it was observed that the disturbed sample exhibited an inability to deal
with the structurally isomorphic problems when they were presented in
verbal rather than picture form.

That is; disturbed boys could cope with
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certain problems when presented to them in picture fashion, but not when
the information was conveyed in verbal terms.

Further inspection revealed

that the 11-and 12-year-old boys could solve the more simple verbal problems
but not the complex verbal problems.
The results were seen as indicating that the Rimoldi method was
sensitive to differences in cognitive functioning among disturbed children
while scores based on number correct did not reveal differences between
the groups.

More importantly, these results indicate that a preferable

approach to teaching disturbed children may be a nonverbal one since this
may be comprehensible to them while verbal communication containing the
same information might not be.
•
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APPENDIX A
Problems used in this investigation
Jimmy's grandfather gave Jimmy some big and small balls. They
were of two colors, blue and gray. Jimmy misplaced one kind. Which
one did he misplace -- the big or the small, the blue or the gray?
Answers

Questions*
1.

Airplane

No

2.

Big gray balls

No

3.

Black balls

No

lf..

Big and small gray balls

No

s.

Wagons

No

6.

Boat

No

7.

Yellow balls

No

e.

Small gray balls ,

No

9.

Ponies

•

No
I

10.

No

Big blue balls

*In all the P problems the "questions" are drawings presented on cards.
The description of the corresponding drawing is given next to the
number of the card.
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Mark had saved enough money to buy a new toy, so he went to
the toy store. He saw boats, cars and trucks. They were either
white or gray or black. He wanted to buy only one. Which one did he buy?
Questions

Answers

1.

White, gray, black boats

No

2.

A chair

No

3.

A white car

No

4.

White, gray, black cars

No

s.

Horses

No

6.

Wagons

No

7.

White and black trucks

No

8.

A yellow boat

No

9.

A white boat and white car

No

A gray boat

No

10.

62

31VA
Instructions and Corresponding Questions and Answers

John has 20 horses. There are black race horses and white race
horses. There are black farm horses and white farm horses. I want
you to figure out how many black farm horses there are?
Questions

Answers

l.

How many horses does John ride?

l.

10.

2.

How many white horses does John have?

2.

7.

3.

How many brown horses does John have?

3.

o.

4.

How many white racing horses does
John have?

4.

s.

s.

How many black racing horses does
John have?

5.

s.

6.

How many brown racing horses does
John have?

6.

o.

7.

How many white farm horses does,
John have?

7 •.

2.

\,

a.

How many brown farm horses does
John have?

a.

o.

9.

How many horses did John sell?

9.

o.
o.

10.

How many ponies does John have?

10.
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Instructions and Corresponding Questions and Answers

Joe and his two friends Peter and Mark went to the store to
buy some marbles. Each one of them bought some green ones, some red
ones, and some blue ones. Altogether they bought 45 marbles. How many
blue marbles did Mark buy?
Questions
1.

How many green marbles did the three
of them buy?

2; How many red marbles and green marbles

Answers
l.

15.

2.

10.

did Peter buy?
3.

Did they use the marbles right away?

3.

Yes.

4.

How many green marbles did Mark buy?

4.

5.

5.

How many red marbles did Peter buy?

s.

5.

6.

Did Peter buy more marbles than Joe?

6.

No.

7.

Are the red marbles larger than the .
green ones?

7.

No.

a.

How many blue marbles did Joe and
Peter buy?

8.

10.

9.

Did they buy anything else besides
marbles?

9.

No.

10.

How many red marbles did the three
of them buy?

10.

15.
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Instructions and Corresponding Questions and Answers
We have 50 objects called C. There are two kinds of C's, one
kind is called B, the other kind is called G. Any B can be either an
Rora T, and any G can be either an Rora T. No B can be a G and no
R can be a T.
Will you find out how many of the G objects are also
called T?
Questions

Answers

1.

How many K's are there?

1.

11.

2.

How many R objects are also called G?

2.

15.

3.

How ma11y T·objects are also called B?

3.

10.

4.

How many N objects are there?

4.

10.

5.

How much is K times C?

5.

550

6.

Are there more G than B objects?

6.

No.

-

,

7.

How many R objects are

ther~?

7.

35.

a.

Are there more R objects than
T objects?

a.

Yes.

9.

Are there any objects called M?

9.

No.

10.

20.

10.

How many R objects are also called B?

~5

35VB

Instructions and Corresponding Questions and Answers
We have three kinds of T.objects. One kind is called M,
another kind is called N, and another kind is called P. Further, each
H, N, or P can also be called either a Q, a R, or an s. Altogether
there are fifty objects. How many o~-the.N objects are also called S?
Questions

Answers

l.

How many Q objects and R objects
are called P?

l.

15.

2.

How many M objects and P objects are
also called S?

2.

5.

3.

Are there more Q objects than S objects?

3.

Yes.

4.

How many N objects are called Q?

4.

s.

5.

How many objects are called Q?

5.

25.

6.

How many M objects are called A?

6.

o.

7.

How many objects are called R? .

7.

15.

\

8T

Are there more P objects than R objects?

e.

Yes.

9.

How many objects are called K?

9.

o.

10.

5.

10.

How many P objects are also called R?

APPENDIX B
Procedure for Scoring Problems
Assigning a score to an observed tactic involves several stages:
1)

All irrelevant and redundant questions are set aside from the

observed tactic.

This procedure reduces an observed tactic to one of the

possible basic tactics.
2)

The elements remaining in the basic tactic are then analyzed

for order reversals.

For instance, reference to,Figure 2 indicates

that problems built around structure 35 have two types of questions:
B,

c,

and D ·of maximum generality and E, F, and G of less generality

or greater specificity. ·
In the scoring system reversals of questions within each order
of generality are not considered.
the

s~quences

B, C, D, and D, B,

Thus, for the case of Figure 2,

c,

are identical.

But F, B, C implies

·reversals since the order of their occurrence in terms of the specifications
set forth previously should be B, C, F or C, B, F.

The number of more

general questions that appear in the tactic determines the number of
positions in which the less general questions may occur.

That is, questions

B and C determine three possible positions for any specific question: either
before, in between, or following them.

If a specific question follows

a general question, it is arbitrarily assigned a positional number of l•
66
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Other positions are assigned values related to the number of steps that
they are removed from the "logical" order.

So que•tion F has the following

values: 1 if in sequences C, B, For B, C, F, 2/3 if in sequences B, F, C,
or C, F, B, and 1/3 if in sequences F, B, C, or F, C, B.
The general formula ta determine these positional numbers is:
a .
PJ

= 1 - i'
k

where a . is positional number for a question p in

posit~on

PJ

j, j corresponds to the number of steps that the question pis removed

from its "logical" order, and k is number of possible steps.

This formu-

lation can be extended to problems with any values of k, where O j
3)

(k-1).

With the positional numbers as defined in 2) above, a matrix

L is built in which the rows correspond to all the questions presented
with a problem and the columns to the basic tactics as specified in 1)
above.

In the cells of matrix L, the corresponding positional numbers:are

entered, the values for the irrelevant and redundant questions being zero.
An example of such matrix is given in;.Riflloldi, Chlapecka
4)

Two conditions determine the information

values (I) assigned to each question.
~he

Aghi (1970).

Each question in the problem is assigned a value in terms of

the information it provides.

to

&

First, assigning a score of l.OO

ideal tactic limits the information values of the x relevant

questions.

The more relevant questions in a problem, the smaller will be

the information weight of each.

The second condition relates the information

weight of a general question to those of its equivalent class.
formation weight of a question at level t is defined as:
It

= (r

+r - 1 ) I
r

Ct +

1)

The in-

60

where r is the number of elements in the equivalent class (sub-branches).
A (1 x,n) row vector W (W , W •••••• w) may be used to represent
1
2
n
these information values for a given logical structure. A sample follows.
Notice the information value of a given general question is greater than
the sum of information values' of its sub-branches by an amount directly
related to the number of branches r.

This process allows a weighting

for parsimony or economy of a tactic.
5)

The score of basic tactic (x.)' where i
1

= 1 •••• m,

can be re-

presented as a linear function of the information weights and of the
positional numbers so that,
,-

x.=
1

w a • +w a
l

11

2

2i

+••••••• + w a .•
n

ni

Similarly,

for all the other basic tactics.
In the (n x m) matrix L, all the basic tactics corresponding to a
'

given structure may be represented by the (m) columns, while the (n) rows
correspond to all the questions in the problem.

The (1 x n) row vector X,

gives the score for all the basic tactics and is obtained by the matrix
multiplication:

X = WL.
6)

The final step analyzes the tactics for the use of redundant

and/or irrelevant questions.

The total amount of irrelevancy is set equal

to -1.00 to be divided among the irrelevant questions of the problem.
If a problem has three irrelevant questions, each one of them has a value
Ir

= -0.33.
A relevant question is redundant when it appears in a tactic

with a more general question covering the same information.

Instead of

receiving a positive information value, all the redundant possibilities

69

share a total weight of -0.25.

If there are two possibilities as in

Figure 2a for example, either c 2 pr d 2 with a , then c or d with a 1 would
1
2
2
receive a weight of Rd = -0.125 instead of a positive information weight
as would occur if the a

question were not in the tactic.
1
The score for the observed tactic i is defined then as Si
,

xl.. + Ir. + Rd., where -LOO!
l.
l.
of the basic tactic.

Ir.~
1

O, and

=

-o. 25S Rd i-< O and x1 is the score

Further technicalities and rationale for this scoring system can
be found in the work by Rimoldi cited earlier (Rimoldi et al., 1970).
r
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